Given n concave continuous functions u, defined over the unit /«-cube Im, the corresponding attainable set V and Pareto surface P are defined. In the economic interpretation, V corresponds to the set of attainable utility outcomes realized through trading, and P the set of such outcomes for which no trader can attain more without another getting less. Sets of the form of V and P are characterized among all subsets of R". The notion of complexity (the smallest m for which a given V can be realized) is briefly discussed, as is the idea of a "market game".
1. Introduction. The notion of an «-trader w-commodity pure trading economy is discussed by Shapley and Shubik in [6] , where they characterize the class of "transferable utility market games" among all such games. It is our purpose to study in detail the class of market games without transferable utility (see, e.g., Scarf [5] ). We restrict considerations to the class of markets discussed in [6] , namely those having finitely many commodities and traders (w and n respectively), and having the preferences of each trader given by a concave continuous utility function ut.
In §2, we define the attainable set of utilities for a market, and the associated Pareto surface. The main result (Theorem 2.3) characterizes attainable sets as those sets of the form C-£" where C is compact and convex. In fact, any such set can be realized by a market with m=nin-1) commodities and utility functions that are nondecreasing (in each variable).
In §3, we define the complexity of an attainable set V to be the least number of commodities needed in a market realization of V. An example is given of a set having complexity equal to two. In §4, market games are It is easy to see that V must be a closed convex set, and P is included in the boundary of V. However, P need not be closed. This will follow from our characterization of V and from the example of [1, p. 89 ].
In the following, we will investigate some operations under which the class of attainable sets is invariant. If/ and g are real valued functions on Im and /' respectively, then we define/©g and fKg from Im+l to R as follows: if (x,y)elmxll = lm+l, then (f(Bg)(x,y)=f(x)+g(y) and (fAg)(x, y)=f(x)Ag(y) = m'm(f(x), g(y)). Note that if / and g are continuous, concave and nondecreasing, then so are/©g andfAg. Lemma We are now able to give a characterization of the class of attainable sets. Wedenote A^=[0, oo)". Theorem 2.3. V^R" is the attainable set for some concave continuous Uy, ■ ■ ■ , un on the unit m-cube Im for some m>0 if and only if V=C-R" where 0 #C£ Rn is compact and convex. Further, a representation can be given with m^n(n-l) and the u¡ nondecreasing.
Proof. Suppose V is the attainable set for ut, i= 1, • • • , n, on /*". It is easy to verify that V=C-R" where C is the convex hull of A, and A = j(Ul(/), . . ., «"(/•)) | f e r, J f = emj.
Since the u¿ are continuous, A is compact and hence C is compact and convex.
Conversely, suppose V=C-£". By (2.2.1), we may assume without loss of generality that C^I". We will adopt the following notation: if Again, we must have b^.0. Since we have assumed Cs/*, we must also have ß^.0.
If i is such that ¿>¿>0, then (bM¡b¡, /?/é¡) e S1,.. Since x 6 F!, there must be a y e Vi such that y{i) ef-1, y-fAy^), y^x, and hence (b,y)>ß. Then We note here that if the definition of attainable set is altered to require that each ut be the restriction of a concave, continuous function g, defined (and finite) over all of R™, then Theorem 2.3 is still true. In fact, g¡ can be produced that are defined (and finite) over all of R'". One can show this by changing the proof of Theorem 2.3 as follows. We may assume first that C is contained in [0, |]". Now define S; = {(a, ß) e S'i | for some xeC, <x(i), a) + x, = ß). Defining/:: £"_1->-£ as we defined/, but with S" in place of S't, the proof will follow as before, providing we can show f(y) is finite for all y e Ä"-1. Since/ is nonincreasing, it is enough to show/(y) is finite for all y e Kffx.
As before,/(y) is finite for y e In-\ Let y e /cTV"^1. Let (a, ß) e S", and suppose x e C is such that {xu\ a)+xt=ß.
Then x{i) e [0, i]""1 and ß-{xw,a)=xi=l.
Let ||/>j| =maxi 1/»^ for p e Rn~\ We have \\x{i}\\ = 2-, and so \\xH)+y¡2\]y\\ ||<;i. Thus x^+y/2\\y\\ el"-1, and ß-(x"+yl2\\y\\,a)= 1 -n.
Using this along with the fact that/3 -(xu),a}--\, we get -{y,a) --2\\y\\n, and hence ß -(y, a)>ß-2 \\y\\ n = -2 \\y\\ n.
It then follows that/(j)^-2||>'||/2.
Complexity.
Let s/n be the collection of all attainable sets in R". For V e sin, we define the complexity of V (com V) to be the least integer //i_0 such that F can be represented by u/s over /"' as in (2.1.1). Here we take £°={0}, and hence com K=0 if and only if Kcan be represented with constant m/s. It is easily seen that com V=0 if and only if V={x} -££ for some x e Rn.
If we define com^"' = suplw»com K, we see from Theorem 2.3 that com sén_n(n-1). Clearly com s/1=0 and it is easy to check that com s/2=l.
In [3] the authors study, in particular, those Ves/" with complexity equal to one. It is shown that com FSÍ1 if and only if V = {x e R" | hx(xx) + ■■■ + hn(xn) = a} for aeR and h¡:R->-£U{co} satisfying {(x, y) e £2|y^-h¿(x)} is an attainable set in R2 for each /'. In particular, each ht must be convex and nondecreasing. Using this characterization, geometrical necessary conditions for a set to have complexity one are derived.
As a result of the above discussion, one can see that 2¿com ,a/3^6. To show the lower bound we must exhibit a V e si* such that com K>1.
Let V=C-R\
where C is the convex hull of the set {(1,0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0,0,1),(0, 1,1)}.
A representation for V over I2 is given by ux(x,y)=xAy, u2(x,y)=y and u3(x, y)=x. If Khad complexity equal to one, then there would exist nondecreasing, convex functions of one variable, h¡, h2, h3, and a e R such that V = {(Xy, X2, X3) | hy(Xy) + h.¿(X.¿) + h3(x3) Z% ü\.
One can assume that, for points on the Pareto surface of V, equality holds in the above expression. Thus hx(0)+h2(l)+h3(0)=a and hx(0)+h2(T) + h3(l)=a which implies h3(0)=h3(l). Now since (1, 0, 0) e V we must have (1,0, 1) g V, which is not the case. Thus the complexity of V is two.
One of the authors is willing to conjecture that com ,s/"=n-] for every n. The function V which associates with each 5 the set V(S) is called a market game (see [5] and [6] ). From Theorem 2.3 it follows that each V(S) is of the form Cs-R% where C^R* is compact and convex, and R% = RHC\R7i. In general, one can define a game to be any function V on 2A such that each V(S)=Cii-R%, where Cs£ RH is compact and convex. An interesting problem is to characterize the market games as a subset of all games.
In [6] , Shapley and Shubik posed this problem while solving a related one. Given a market game V, they define a set function v:2s^-R by v(S) = max 2 x¡, xeF(.S') ¡e.S and characterize these among all set functions on 2A.
In [2] the authors obtain a characterization of market games among the polyhedral games, i.e., games for which each Cs is a polyhedron. The methods used there are special to polyhedra and do not seem to generalize. Unfortunately, the methods of this paper do not lend themselves to solving the problem for nonpolyhedral V. However, we can prove that a special class of games are market games using Theorem 2.3. We say a game Kis a pure bargaining (or unanimity) game if 0 £ V(N) while for each S^N,
ViS) = {0}-Rl
License or copyright restrictions may apply to redistribution; see https://www.ams.org/journal-terms-of-use Theorem 4.1. Every pure bargaining game is a market game. Further there is a representation with m'=n2 and nondecreasing ut.
Proof.
By Theorem 2.3, V(N) is the attainable set for some ux, ■ ■ ■ ,un on P for some l-n(n-1). Let of1, ■ ■ ■ ,con el1 be any points such that 2"=i coi=el. Let m=l+n, and let ûf.^^-R be defined by u¡(y, x)=ufy)A WMjOcrAXaA-• 'AxJ where (y, x) ellxln=lm, and mi = maxxeV<N) x¡.
Finally, let cui = (coi, a*), where ai is the z'th unit vector in In. Clearly, 2<e/v <wi=(e!, e")=el+n and V is the associated market game. Also we have m^n2. For more on market games, see also [7] .
